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REFLECTIONS ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION
Gary Krueger
I. Introduction
In the formerly centrally planned economies it is accepted that
the market economy is a more desirable method of allocating
resources than the alternative allocation, via command or direc-
tive. Most observers and participants in this process also assume
that the transition to a market economy will be long and diffi-
cult. Finally, there is an implicit assumption that all of the diffi-
culties associated with the transition will be worthwhile because
the additional benefits of a market economy will offset the short-
and medium-term pain of the transition. Under this set of
assumptions the end is viewed as the market economy, per se,
while one need only quibble as to the means of arriving there.
Much as one might dispute which is the best mode of transport
to cross the ocean, the only point of debate concerning the tran-
sition need concern the rate of transition, i.e., big bang, or shock
therapy versus some nebulously defined “gradualism.”1
This paper explores the implications of accepting the first and
third assumptions, while rejecting the second: namely that the
transition to a market economy will be lengthy and difficult. Of
course, it is ludicrous to argue that the current situation in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe is not difficult. Rather, this paper will
argue that the transition to market has already happened and
that the difficult part of the transition is not related to the eco-
nomic transformation, but to the creation of a society founded
on the principles of rule by law and the sovereignty of the indi-
vidual over the state. From this perspective, many transition
societies have lost sight of the “end,” which is the creation of a
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civil society based on some agreed upon rules of behavior ide-
ally codified in law.
As we will see, failure to move toward this end has had disas-
trous consequences for many transition economies, especially
Russia. It is important to note that in effecting this transforma-
tion to a civil society, markets and laissez-faire economic policies
may not necessarily play a significant role. However, given the
experiences these societies have had with central planning, one
expects an outcome closer to laissez-faire than to a dirigiste alter-
native. Failure to recognize the fundamental fact that the market
is only a “tool for moving things around,” or allocating
resources, and not a means to an end has left many of these soci-
eties socially and politically directionless. This lack of direction
has contributed to rampant crime, corruption, and an overall
sense of anarchy in many transition societies.2
This paper will examine the transformation process in Central
and Eastern Europe beginning from the perspective of an econo-
mist who has been fortunate to observe the transition in Russia
since 1992. Some social and political implications of the eco-
nomic process will then be considered. A hypothesis maintained
throughout this paper is that the economics of the transition are
relatively straightforward. The far more difficult task is eliciting
a political mandate resulting in agreed upon principles govern-
ing dispute resolution, contract enforcement, and related
aspects of economic and social behavior. In the democracies of
the West these principles are easily taken for granted and have
become almost invisible.3 Before we begin, it is important to
understand why these principles were initially absent in most
transition economies, and in doing so we need to ask what cen-
tral planning was and how it worked.
II. A Short Primer on the Economics of Central Planning
For many reasons, socialist principles led leaders to prefer an
administrative/command as opposed to a market system of
allocation. An economic rationale favoring a command econ-
omy over a market economy was that the market was “anar-
chic,” i.e., prone to excessive volatility and often choosing an
inappropriate mix of output and technology. Also, it was gener-
ally accepted that command economies, through mobilizing
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resources on a large scale, could create industrial enterprises
capable of exploiting economies of scale. Implicitly and explic-
itly it was also assumed that decision-making is best left up to
those at the top levels of the hierarchy. Simply put, the socialist
planned economy was predicated upon paternalism, where the
center knew best as to the optimal allocation of resources.
In practice, centrally planned economies constructed enter-
prises that were huge by any standard and concentrated deci-
sion-making authority for entire industries in just a few hands.
Legal authority for allocating resources rarely extended far
down the hierarchy. With relatively few people involved in
resource allocation, the rules and regulations governing such
activity need not necessarily be codified or very complex. Unlike
Western companies, the value of legal, as opposed to technolog-
ical, knowledge in a centrally planned enterprise was very low.
Consequently, the preferred career path for management was
engineering.
Even though planners needed to communicate with few
enterprises in an industry, problems of coordination, i.e., ensur-
ing that the same number of nuts and bolts are produced at the
same time, plagued the economy. These coordination problems
are intrinsic to the very nature of planned economies. Grossman
(1963) has shown that the commands that govern resource allo-
cation must necessarily contain some level of aggregation, that
is, they must be stated more or less broadly and they must be
stated using some unit of measure. The level of aggregation may
be over products—for example, superiors (planners) may give a
directive to an enterprise to produce “shoes,” rather than “Nike
Air Jordans size 11.5, white with black stripes”—or the aggrega-
tion may be over time, as in “Produce these products by the end
of the year.”
The consequence of aggregation is that subordinates in any
hierarchical organization always have some autonomy or dis-
cretion in decision-making. Informal mechanisms for allocating
resources emerged to fill the voids where central preferences
and directives were unspecific, unclear, or contradictory. The
result was that a significant fraction of economic activity was
allocated on an “informal” basis where managerial discretion
played an important role in the final outcome.
Macalester International Vol. 2
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A significant determinant of economic performance, and an
eventual contributor to the collapse of central planning, was
how managers used their discretion. In an effort to induce man-
agers to perform as planners, desired managerial performance
was monitored and rewards (bonuses) paid out accordingly. In
the Soviet Union, and elsewhere with slight variations, planners
issued plans typically directing enterprises to produce five to
seven different products, for which prices remained fixed, then
rewarded managers and workers on the basis of plan fulfill-
ment. With roughly 45,000 enterprises in the Soviet Union and
so few products produced per enterprise, variety, style, and
quality were typically absent in centrally planned economies.4
The mix of output of a planned economy was the economic
equivalent of the tundra, a few large species and very little else.
Because planners were forced to ensure that certain technical
relationships were maintained—for example, four tires were
produced for each automobile—plans were issued in physical
(not monetary) units, i.e., tons or units. Planning in a “physical”
economy was more convenient if prices remained fixed, which
they did for decades at a time. Because so much depended upon
fulfillment of the plan, managers sought ways to ensure that
they would always fulfill their plans.5 If plans were in tons, man-
ufacturers of tires sought to make tires only for large trucks; if
plans were in units, better to make lots of tires for motorcycles.
Because the informational burdens of coordinating economic
activity were so great, tire manufacturers were able to undertake
these decisions independently of other manufacturers. Similar
problems occurred throughout all levels of the economy, result-
ing in ubiquitous shortages and also tremendous waste of mate-
rials, time, and energy. Planners wishing to address the problem
of tire assortment would have had to “spend” more of their
scarce planning resources on the tire industry and less else-
where — for example, the chemical industry — giving more dis-
cretion to managers of chemical plants. The tendency was for
planners to devote most of their energy to “putting out fires”
and relatively little to longer-term strategic planning.
Cheating on the assortment of production was not the only
method through which enterprising managers sought to ensure
plan fulfillment. Because materials were in shortage, managers
would reduce the quantity of materials in many products,
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reducing quality but allowing for the production of larger quan-
tities of output.6 Also as a consequence of shortages, managers
sought to hoard whatever was available, labor for “storming” at
the end of the month, or capital and materials for producing
more output or for barter with other enterprises. Significant
entrepreneurial activity was directed at obtaining materials with
specialists known as Tolkachi (“pushers”), who wined and dined
and otherwise bribed potential suppliers, much as salespeople
in market economies do for potential customers. Managers also
bargained for as much materials as they could obtain, while
simultaneously seeking the lowest possible plan target, effec-
tively providing “disinformation” about their true capacity to
superiors. As managers overordered materials, shortages
became more intense, hoarding and its consequent deceit, more
necessary.
Consumers as well as managers would make purchases, not
because the product was what they wanted, but because they
could probably barter it with someone who could use it.7 Infor-
mal connections and semilegal and illegal markets dominated
allocation of consumer goods. In addition, material supplies and
other consumer goods became stores of wealth, as money corre-
spondingly was devalued, effectively demonetizing the econ-
omy and all of the industries associated with money and
finance. One of the most serious problems of transition
economies has been overcoming the legacy of a “demonetized”
economy. This legacy includes not just an absence of physical
capital associated with the finance industry, but, more impor-
tant, a shortage of people schooled in accounting, finance, insur-
ance, and all related activities.
Reforms begun in the 1960s and continuing until the aban-
donment of central planning were mostly designed to “mone-
tize” the economy, especially the enterprise production plan.
Plan targets were altered from output in physical units to
“sales.” However, with fixed prices, “sales” began to mean
“quantity delivered” to the (usually) unhappy customer. Also,
with fixed prices, financial targets such as “profits” had little
economic content, especially when supervising ministries
tended to skim surplus profits from one enterprise to cover
losses at another, a process known as “leveling.” With the
exceptions of Hungary in the late 1960s and China in the late
Macalester International Vol. 2
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1970s, where central planning was abandoned first in agricul-
ture and later in consumer services and small industry, reform
attempts probably did more harm than good.
In Hungary, China, and, later, Poland, flexible prices elimi-
nated most shortages for most products, although large state
enterprises continued to receive subsidies, draining other sec-
tors of the economy of scarce resources. Reforms in the Soviet
Union were far more timid, usually amounting to little more
than changing plan targets for bonus determination or changing
the organizational structure in order to better supervise enter-
prise directors. For the next twenty-five years the Soviet 
economy was on a “treadmill of reforms,” seemingly making
changes, only to find they contradicted essential aspects of the
system, which could not be altered without abandoning social-
ism. A consequence of the more aggressive reform strategy in
Hungary and Poland was that activity in gray and black mar-
kets was less significant than in the Soviet Union, resulting in a
greater amount of activity conducted on a “legitimate” basis.
By the mid-1980s it had become obvious to citizens and lead-
ers alike that central planning was a failure. The incentives of
the system had led managers to produce an energy-hungry, out-
dated mix of goods using excessive quantities of raw materials,
satisfying few customers. Because managers were reluctant to
engage in major innovations that might threaten short-term plan
fulfillment, factor productivity (how much output a unit of capi-
tal or labor produces) began to decline. Were it not for ever
greater extraction of raw materials and ever higher levels of
investment, growth in output would have also declined. Geol-
ogy and demographics (i.e., a declining birth rate) dictated that
continued existence of central planning was untenable.
The legacy of central planning had left an environmental dis-
aster, an economy and populace lacking any basic understand-
ing of the role and use of markets, with huge, often antiquated
industrial enterprises. It had also left a legacy of “an informal”
po svyazom (through connections) system of allocation where the
prevailing attitude was “rules are to be gotten around” not
observed.8 Finally, attitudes toward the market were viewed
through the distorting prism of Western media and socialist ide-
ology, which had succeeded in inextricably linking “market”
and “anarchy” together. Western media, with its imagery of
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mass consumption, had convinced the population in the region
that all that was necessary to achieve the immense wealth and
high standard of living of the West was a market economy. The
market economy had become the end in and of itself.
III. The Transition to Market
The first step in implementing a market economy — freeing up
prices to seek their own level—proved exceptionally simple and
efficacious. Shortages that had grown ubiquitous in the late
1980s in the Soviet Union had evaporated within a month. The
barren landscape of central planning left considerable room for
once rare consumer goods, which now were available almost
overnight. Even though large segments of the economy were
still in state hands, the vast majority of resources in the economy
were now allocated via the market. From this perspective, it is
possible to say that the transition to a market economy was over
almost as soon as it began.
The near instantaneous elimination of shortages came at sig-
nificant cost. Freeing up prices instantly, for those unable to sell
their home currency for dollars, quickly wiped out the meager
savings of the population.9 In what became known as the “trans-
formation recession,” official statistics indicated 50-percent
declines in GDP over a three-year period.10 Previously unheard
of unemployment began to appear throughout the region,
although it remained below U.S. and West European levels,
especially in the Czech Republic and the former Soviet Union.
For many countries, unaccustomed to controlling the rate of
money growth with indirect means, such as interest rates, infla-
tion became a disquieting aspect of everyday life. After decades
in which prices of most consumer goods had not changed at all
or only slightly, prices of consumer goods rose 20 and 30 percent
per month.11 Consumers had serious difficulty adjusting to the
new realities. Rapid inflation meant that prices changed weekly
or daily, while wage increases tended to lag behind price
increases. Rapid inflation created considerable “price disper-
sion” (situations in which identical goods in equivalent, or
sometimes identical, locations sold for different prices).
Moving from the system where resources were allocated
through connections to one where transactions were predictable
Macalester International Vol. 2
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and honest was complicated by the absence of regulatory over-
sight of product quality and quantity, and by the attitude that
“anything goes” because of the (anarchic) market economy.
Street vendors used multiple means of getting around the new
rules of a market economy: using underweight scales, selling
products past their expiration date, cheating on the total receipt,
counterfeiting Western products, and so on. Many consumers
countered by bringing their own weights for checking scales
and calculators for checking receipts and sampling products
before purchasing. For purchases of consumer nondurables,
such as food, these measures were adequate; however, for pur-
chases of more complicated durable goods, such as automobiles,
consumers were at the mercy of sellers. Deceit and fraud coex-
isted with many transactions.
Moreover, most retailing and wholesaling activity took place
in kiosks, vegetable stands, or from the backs of trucks. Few
large-scale outlets in permanent locations existed, except the
state stores, with their mediocre service and selection. Although
small in scale, this form of kiosk retailing proved exceptionally
flexible. If business turned sour, the probability of recovering
one’s capital, due to the robust market for kiosks, was high.
Moreover, if the government, or the mafia, increased taxes or
“cover charges” (krisha) to kiosk operators, the kiosk could be
moved to another location. Very little risk and potentially high
rates of return induced entrepreneurs to favor the kiosk. The
disadvantage of kiosk capitalism was that operations remained
small in scale, lacking focus and strategic vision.
The same flexibility, which was the paramount objective of
most retail operators, could not be had through establishing
retail facilities in a permanent location. Local government agen-
cies might renationalize the shop, mafia might move in (or raise
cover charges), and, given the nebulous property laws and gov-
ernment involvement in the transaction, reselling the shop
might prove difficult and expensive. Moreover, permanent facil-
ities were easier for local governments to monitor and collect
receipts from for tax purposes, reducing one’s profits. Tax eva-
sion had become the new “game” for entrepreneurs and citizens
alike. As transactions were predominately in cash with receipts
easily altered, local governments found raising revenue a vexing
problem. If tax rates increased to recover the lost revenue, the
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incentive to hide more receipts increased. The fact that local
governments were deprived of revenue meant that they had lit-
tle money to pay police, contributing to the overall sense of
anarchy and providing greater incentives for corruption.
Although larger establishments began to appear in Russia in
1994 and 1995, kiosks still dominated retailing. This was not true
in other formerly centrally planned economies. Visits to Warsaw
in 1993 and the Czech Republic in 1995 revealed a more normal
economy, where well-kept shops had specialized along well-
defined product lines. Why had small-scale “kiosk capitalism”
so persistently dominated the economy in Russia? Was the dom-
inance of kiosk capitalism related to the “culture” of fraud?
It turns out that it probably was. In order to undertake larger
scale operations, entrepreneurs would need to raise capital in
order to finance their plans. Many directors I have interviewed
over the past two years in Russia have had excellent strategies
for navigating the turbulent waters of Russia’s economy; how-
ever, they often failed to “think big,” i.e., think long-term and on
a large scale. When asked why they did not implement more
grandiose plans, the universal response was “money.” Banks
would not lend to firms to finance anything other than acquisi-
tion of inventories, usually on a three-month basis. Another
ingredient missing from Russia’s newly formed market econ-
omy was a well-functioning capital market in which investors
could channel their resources to entrepreneurs and receive a
competitive rate of return with a reasonable level of risk. Russia
had a market economy without capitalism.
In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, banks had taken a
large equity position in formerly state owned enterprises, pro-
viding capital on reasonable terms.12 Hungary and Poland, with
a much longer history of small-scale ownership and significant
levels of foreign investment, seemed to have obviated the Russ-
ian stage of kiosk capitalism. A prerequisite to the creation of
capital markets is definition of property rights that will be main-
tained for the duration of the contract or life of the asset. Rus-
sia’s political and social turmoil could not deliver a promise of a
reasonable level of risk for most investors.
Two problems needed to be solved before this situation could
be rectified. National and local governments needed to credibly
commit to maintaining and enforcing property rights.13 This
Macalester International Vol. 2
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would include the establishment of means of legal redress and
dispute resolution. Also, it was necessary to mitigate the ram-
pant crime and threats to property by mafia and other “hooli-
gans.” In the absence of these safeguards, investment for all but
the most lucrative projects failed to materialize. These legal
measures lie at the heart of a capitalist/market economy. Not
only do they provide some insurance for investors, but, by
increasing the potential risk of fraudulent activity, they also pro-
vide an incentive to retailers to engage in “honest” commerce.
Very little economic activity, except for that at the most rudi-
mentary level, takes place under conditions of anarchy.
Because capital markets cannot develop under conditions of
anarchy, failure in the task of building a civil society destines the
economy and the society to an existence of “petty capitalism” in
which capital formation and other large-scale transactions are
limited by the resources at the disposal of one’s immediate
friends and family. Under these conditions, a transaction or pool
of capital can be no larger than the funds available to one’s clan,
limiting investment to small-scale, quick-payoff projects. Capital
markets that exist outside the clan — for example, bank lending
— are dominated by short-term, fully collateralized, highly liq-
uid loans that do little to fundamentally restructure the econ-
omy. The best example of this type of lending is loans to finance
acquisition of inventories for a retailer or wholesaler.14 In short,
the missing ingredient in Russia’s economy is trust, and the
mechanisms of legal redress that support, enforce, and build
that trust. Once established, this state of affairs may easily create
a stable equilibrium where trust outside one’s clan does not
exist, perpetuating mistrust and an environment of economic
and social treachery.15
The primary source of uncertainty for investors in Russia
remains political instability, and the inability of Russia’s politi-
cal system to establish conditions under which contracts will be
enforced with sufficiently high probability. Understanding the
links between political stability, the development of capital mar-
kets, and overall economic health is essential to understanding
the differences between Russia and its Central European coun-
terparts. By nearly all assessments, due to political and legal
instability, Russia remains one of the riskiest countries in which
to invest, second only to Iraq.16
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IV. Conclusion
The most surprising aspect of Russia’s transition is that in spite
of the instability, lawlessness, and sense of anarchy, the econ-
omy has continued to move forward. Each year has seen
improvements in the development of capital markets and the
creation of instruments that improve on contract enforcement.
Interestingly, many of these instruments are not the result of
changes in government policy. Some are the result of criminal
elements (mafia) wishing to ensure higher rates of return on
“their” investments. Many are spontaneous private arrange-
ments based on relationships that have built up during the past
three years.17
Nevertheless, Russia remains in turmoil, and the economic
recovery is extremely fragile. The single largest factor contribut-
ing to this turmoil is the fact that, unlike Hungary, Poland,
Czech Republic, and Slovakia, Russia is not now, nor has it ever
been, a democracy. Yeltsin was elected in 1991 before the coup
and the breakup of the Soviet Union, and before the move to a
market economy had begun. The current parliament was
elected, literally under the barrel of a gun.
In contrast, Poland and Hungary have had peaceful transfers
of power resulting from, more or less, fair elections. The govern-
ment in the Czech Republic has enjoyed strong support, in spite
of the difficult economic situation and in spite of the split with
Slovakia. The economies in these countries are, consequently,
attracting large amounts of foreign capital and are beginning to
recover from the transformation recession.
By promoting some measure of stability and allowing major-
ity expression in which societal goals are debated and discussed,
democratic institutions create conditions in which investors may
make rational decisions about expected risk and rates of return.18
Once this process has taken place the range of parameters of
political and social behavior becomes comprehensible, if not
predictable. As the process continues and power is peaceably
transferred, this range of possibilities narrows. The damning
short-termism that characterizes the “noisy phase” of the transi-
tion evaporates, and investors and lenders undertake longer
term projects that address the most serious economic problems
of formerly planned economies.
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Notes
1. For an excellent critique of the gradualist perspective see Joseph A. Brada,
“A Critique of the Evolutionary Approach to the Economic Transition from
Communism to Capitalism” in Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, ed., The Evolutionary
Transition to Capitalism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).
2. This statement applies most strongly to Russia; however, crime and corrup-
tion are present in great abundance in all transition economies.
3. This is not to suggest that these principles are universally shared in market
economies of the West. It is difficult to imagine competing drug gangs agree-
ing to arbitrate a territorial dispute.
4. At the height of central planning in the Soviet Union roughly 60,000 prod-
ucts were actually planned. By way of comparison, this was about the same
number of products produced by Matsushita Electric and 3M. A typical Amer-
ican supermarket might stock 30,000 or so different product types.
5. In the 1930s in the Soviet Union, managers who failed to fulfill their plan
were accused of “economic sabotage” and sentenced to labor camps in Siberia
and occasionally were shot. In the latter years of communism, failure to fulfill
the plan would result in reduction of bonuses (roughly 30 percent of salary for
managerial personnel) and often demotion with loss of income and, more
important, perquisites, such as the use of an automobile and preferred hous-
ing.
6. One notorious example of this was the manager of a light bulb plant in the
Soviet Union who reduced the amount of tungsten in the bulbs by one-third,
obviously shortening their operating life. Demand for bulbs on the black mar-
ket increased substantially, which the enterprise was able to meet because,
unknown to planners, it had added a third shift, selling the extra bulbs at a
substantial profit, while still meeting its plan.
7. Once people get in the habit of this type of consumption it can apparently be
hard to break. Up until 1994, a full two years after shortages were eliminated,
one of my friends in Tver, Russia, purchased sugar, primarily to use for tea, in
20 kilogram bags—over 40 pounds’ worth!
8. It should be noted that in Russia this attitude predates the imposition of
communism by the Bolsheviks.
9. It is important to note that saving in a shortage economy is usually not vol-
untary. People save in a shortage economy because there is very little to buy.
The fact that these “surplus” money balances were wiped out with the “big
bang” may not have been such a significant problem as many had surmised.
10. There are many reasons to view the declines in output with skepticism. The
old system overproduced and overconsumed many products such as coal,
steel, and chemical fertilizers. Declines in the output of these products should
be viewed as positive developments for the economy and the environment.
Moreover, under the old system, managers had an incentive to overstate pro-
duction. Now, under the new conditions, managers have an incentive to
understate production in order to avoid paying taxes. Smaller, newly created
firms that rushed in to fill the dearth of consumer services and retail trade out-
lets had the additional incentive of understating receipts in order to avoid
some payments to mafia.
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11. One notorious example is the price of bread in Russia, which had remained
fixed at 60 kopeks from the 1950s until 1991.
12. Many Czech economists with whom I have spoken insist that Czech priva-
tization, in which banks, through mutual funds, ended up controlling large
sectors of the economy is best termed “bankitazation.” The implication being
that these banks were lending on terms that were too generous.
13. The role of local governments in Russia in influencing economic develop-
ment was significant and had a visible impact on economic development in a
particular region. In Nizhni Novgorod, where the local governor, Nemitsov,
had a strong commitment to privatizing state buildings and shops, kiosks were
much less prevalent than in Tver, Moscow, and Novosibirsk.
14. Interviews with enterprise directors and bank officials indicate that the typ-
ical loan in Russia is of three months’ duration. Occasionally loans of up to one
year are made, although this was becoming more common by 1995.
15. An excellent article on the game theoretic aspects of such an outcome is in
Martin Nowak, Robert A. May, and Karl Sigmund, “The Arithmetics of
Mutual Help,” Scientific American 272, no. 6 (June 1995).
16. Several directors of former state-owned firms interviewed in the summer
of 1995 told of how the situation improved throughout 1994 but then got
markedly worse with the invasion of Chechnya.
17. One example of such an arrangement was the “trust letter.” The trust letter
was an agreement to exchange control of an asset (an apartment or car) with-
out officially changing the title. The advantage of the “trust letter” was that it
obviated the need to go through the tedious bureaucratic process of changing
title and filing related papers. In Moscow this process usually took the com-
mitment of several eight-hour days in line, and was rarely completed within
two weeks. Interestingly, the road police (GAI) would honor trust letters as
valid for ownership purposes.
18. It should be noted that “investors” refers not only to “outside” investors,
but to any agent who trades current consumption in favor of future consump-
tion. For example, a person deciding whether or not to pursue higher educa-
tion, or a manager seeking to retool a product line.
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